Shuiqiaos Bridge Barge Landing Craft

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China’s Secret Weapon for a Taiwan Invasion? Meet the Shuiqiao Bridge Barges

China’s newly developed Shuiqiao bridge barges appear tailor-made for a cross-Strait amphibious assault. Reminiscent of the Allied Mulberry harbors that enabled the 1944 D-Day invasion, these vessels underscore Beijing’s determination to integrate Taiwan—by force if necessary. At least two sets of three variants—Shuiqiao-185, -135, and -110—have been identified through open-source imagery, each named according to its hull length with bridge stowed. These self-propelled landing platform utility (LPU) barges are equipped with telescoping Bailey-style bridges and can link into 820-meter (2,690-foot) temporary piers, forming a bridgehead for rapid offload of military vehicles and materiel.

This analysis draws on leading research by J. Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart at the U.S. Naval War College’s China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), examining the Shuiqiaos’ origins, capabilities, limitations, and strategic implications.

Bridge Barges: Echoes of History, Engines of Invasion

Like the Mulberry harbors built to support the Allied invasion of Normandy, the Shuiqiao barges are designed to land follow-on forces—not initial assault waves. Vulnerable to enemy fire, they would only be deployed once a secure beachhead is established. Their utility lies in extending logistical reach beyond established ports, offering the PLA more flexibility along Taiwan’s rugged coastline.

Unlike standard jack-up barges used commercially—which stabilize with vertical spuds—these military barges incorporate extendable bridges, blending mobility with utility. They are purpose-built by China State Shipbuilding Corporation’s COMEC division, with possible involvement from CSSC subsidiaries like China Harzone and equipment from the offshore oil and gas sector.

Initial trials of the first three Shuiqiaos were observed near Zhanjiang, adjacent to the PLA’s Southern Theater Command Navy headquarters. A second trio is under construction, and given China’s industrial capacity, many more could be produced quickly.

Tactical Role and Design Specifics

Shuiqiao barges are not dual-use civilian vessels nor multi-role military assets. Instead, they are specialized tools for high-volume delivery of vehicles and personnel directly to beaches. Dahm and Shugart assess them as PLA Navy auxiliaries, noting their lack of civilian features and AIS transmissions.

China is the only country building such vessels, underscoring the specificity of their intended role: support for an invasion of Taiwan. These vessels are impractical for humanitarian missions where hostile opposition is absent.

As Dahm and Conor Kennedy have documented, the PLA faces major logistical hurdles in executing an over-the-shore invasion. Shuiqiaos aim to address these, enabling roll-on/roll-off operations directly from ships like Ro-Ros and Type 072 LSTs onto causeways formed by the barges.

Each Shuiqiao-185 features a wide stern ramp and side ramps, allowing for up to five simultaneous docking points. The bridges, about six meters wide, can support vehicles ranging from small trucks to 50-ton tanks. A single heavy battalion could be unloaded in as little as 30–60 minutes under ideal conditions.

Constraints and Vulnerabilities

While they expand landing options beyond Taiwan’s limited beaches, Shuiqiaos face real-world limits. They have only been tested in calm waters, and their deployment depends on PLA control of both airspace and coastal terrain. Roads leading off beaches may be bottlenecks—either due to terrain or Taiwanese defenses—potentially turning these logistics assets into liabilities.

Critically, the barges lack self-defense capabilities. In wartime, they would be high-value, vulnerable targets, susceptible to strikes from systems like ATACMS and MLRS. Effective use of the barges requires suppression of Taiwanese defenses and full integration into a broader offensive/defensive battle network.

Strategic Context: A Tool in a Broader Arsenal

Wei Dongxu, a military commentator featured on CCTV in March 2025, described the Shuiqiaos as conduits for transporting masses of heavy equipment while keeping their feet dry. Their appearance, he suggested, would signal that China had gained operational control of surrounding air and sea space—effectively, a mark of invasion progress.

Dismissing these barges as stoppable by improvised defenses would be naive. Combat engineers, as historical precedent shows, can easily clear obstacles. What matters is the force and planning behind their deployment.

While the number of Shuiqiaos required for a full-scale invasion remains unclear, what is evident is their scalability. China can mass-produce these specialized vessels quickly and affordably—far less expensively than large warships, yet with significant strategic value.

A Complicating Factor, Not a Game Changer

Ultimately, the Shuiqiao barges are not a silver bullet. They are, however, a powerful force multiplier—another piece in China’s steadily expanding invasion capability. Their importance will become clearer as they enter regular service, participate in amphibious exercises, and are assigned to operational PLA Navy units such as the 5th or 6th Landing Ship Flotillas.

Their true significance lies not in what they can do alone, but in what they represent: another step toward making a large-scale cross-Strait operation viable. Dahm and Shugart warn that these developments suggest the PLA may be accelerating its readiness timeline to meet Xi Jinping’s 2027 military modernization milestone.

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